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ABSTRACT
Privatization, aimed at decreasing the role of the 
state in the economy and politics, has been a fashionable
policy tool during the 1980s both in many countries and
Turkey.
As far as the Turkish case is concerned, although the 
idea of privatization has been on the agenda from time to 
time since the early years of the Republic (established in 
1923), the policy has gained prominence and started to be
implemented in the post-1980 period, being a part of the
'liberal’ economic policies of the Motherland Party (MP) 
governments.
In this respect, the primary purpose of this study is 
that of evaluating the privatization experience of Turkey in 
the said period by trying to show the fluctuation in the 
policies and inconsistencies in implementation, and 
attempting at accounting for them.
ÖZET
Devletin ekonomi ve siyaset alanındaki rolünü azaltmayı 
hedefleyen özelleştirme, 1980’lerde Türkiye’de ve diğer 
birçok ülkede yaygınca kullanılan bir araç haline gelmiştir.
Türkiye örneği göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, 
Cumhuriyetin kurulduğu ilk yıllardan itibaren özelleştirme 
fikri zaman zaman gündeme geldiği halde ancak 1980 sonrasında 
Anavatan Partisi tarafından kurulan hükümetlerin 'liberal’ 
ekcncmi politikaları kapsamında önem kazanmış ve uygulanmaya 
başianmıştır.
Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, adı geçen dönemde 
Türkiye’deki özelleştirme deneyimi çerçevesinde izlenen 
politika ve uygulamada görülen bazı tutarsızlıkları ortaya 
koyarak konu hakkında genel bir değerlendirme yapmaktır.
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION
The governments have grown rapidly in their size and 
functions and in particular assumed a greater role in the 
economic life of most industrial and developing countries 
during the period stretching from the late 1950s to the mid- 
1970s. Due to the rapid increases in welfare programmes and 
military expenditures as v/ell as the increases in the range 
of public infrastructure and services, there appeared to 
be an absolute increase in public sector spendings.
This rapid expansion of the public sector throughout 
the world faced little reaction; rather it was considered 
beneficial in terms of economic, social and political 
balances until the 1973-1974 oil crisis. However after the 
crisis, with the rise of the oil prices, the non-oil
economies witnessed macroeconomic imbalances due to«,.i'the 
deteoriation in terms of trade, and thus they faced 
difficulties in adjusting to external shocks. It was during 
this period that overly interventionist approaches to the 
economy has begun to be seriously questioned.
As a consequence, there have been attempts for 
reducing the size and the role of the public sector in the 
economy which have started to become a burden on government 
budgets in many countries. So just as the i950-1970 period 
was characterized by the rapid expansion of the public sector 
in the world, during the 1980s there have been widespread 
attempts by policy-makers to curtail state’s economic role by 
relying more heavily on free market for the allocation of 
resources.
The divestiture of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) 
has featured prominently in these attempts just as an earlier 
generation of policy makers had emphasized direct state 
intervention to redress perceived failures in the operation 
of private markets. Thus Privatization was considered to be 
at the vanguard of a world-wide movement in reconsidering the 
legitimate role of the state, as a consequence of the fact 
that, planned economy and increased state intervention had 
been forsaken as a solution to the immediate problems that 
most economies were then confronting.
Privatization first gained prominence in United Kingdom 
under the leadership of Mrs. Thatcher’s conservative 
government. It has been notable in both its scale and its 
high national and international profile.·· Later on the trend 
toward privatization appeared to be world-wide as the
privatization policies have been embraced as enthusiastically 
by the labour governments of Australia and New Zealand as they 
have by some of the conservative governments of Western 
Europe, as well as the governments of Eastern Europe 
countries,·
Privatization, although initiated in the mature Western 
economies, quickly spread to the developing world mainly 
under the impetus of the strong support from the
international donor community namely, The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions have 
induced many countries to reduce public expenditures and to 
adopt policies that would foster efficient use of the 
resources and bring about growth within the framework of 
stabilization policies. Thus, privatization and the 
reform of SEEs have appeared to be new policy tools which 
could be helpful in the realization of the above policies. _
It will not be wrong to say that privatization has 
became one of the most fashionable and wide spread policies 
of the 1980s. A recent study estimates that some 1,400 
privatization efforts were involved in these efforts. These 
countries included China, Tanzania and Algeria, which have 
traditionally favoured a prominent role for the state in 
economy.2
I - Meaning of Privatization
The case for privatization rests upon the supposed 
deficiencies for various forms of state intervention and on 
the adoption of some form of privatized system as a remedy. 
Thus any privatization proposal automatically involves the 
rolling back the state. However, this can take a variety 
of forms. Privatization is an umbrella term used to refer 
to several distinct means of the changing relationship 
between the state and the private sector.
The most visible pattern is the sale of publicly - 
owned assets to private investors. In this sense 
privatization is the opposite of nationalization. 
Contracting-out public work to private firms is another form 
of privatization. The contracting out of some publicly 
provided services such as rubbish collection and cleaning is 
a case in point. Deregulation, that is the introduction 
of competition into statuary monopolies is still another fSfm 
of privatization.^
In this study the concept of privatization will be used 
in the first sense that has been mentioned above, as being 
the form of privatization used for the SEEs in the Turkish 
case. Thus we define the term as a transfer of ownership 
and control from public to private sector with particular 
reference to asset sales.
II - Objectives of Privatization and Critical Points for the
Realization of These Objectives 
1 - Objectives
As far as the objectives of privatization is concerned, 
they can be examined in two separate categories namely the 
general objectives and the specific objectives.
A - General Objectives
The general objectives are the ones which are closely 
related to all the sectors of the economy. Their
realization needs long period of time and depends very much 
upon the economic policy pursued in a country. These can be 
enumerated as follows:^
Strengthening the free market economy; 
Increasing efficiency in the economy; 
Improving income distribution;
. Extending ownership to a wider bases;
. Developing the capital market;
. Encouraging savings and canalizing them to share 
certificates.
B - Specific Objectives
The specific objectives, on the other hand, are the 
ones which are related to the public sector in general and to 
the problems of the SEEs in particular. These can be listed 
as follows:^
. Increasing competition by eliminating public 
monopolies;
. Decreasing the public sector burden on the budget;
. Creating extra funds for the Treasury.
2 - Critical Factors for a Successful Privatization
Once the decision to privatise is made, the short­
term objective which tends to dominate the actual process of 
transfer of ownership, is the enterprises rapid and 
successful sale to private clients. However, there are 
some points which are very critical, for the realization of 
a successful privatization programme.
Firstly, major political parties in a country must be 
in agreement on the basic pattern through which privatization 
of SEES will be carried on. This is crucial for maintaining 
the continuity of the project.
Secondly, the real value of the SEEs which will be 
privatized must be detected carefully.
Thirdly, the spadework must be carried on in the
framework of a coherent plan and the implementation must be 
carried out within the framework of the relevant laws and 
regulations.
Fourthly, the public must be informed through mass
media about the rationale, objectives, as well as the
institutions through which the programme will be carried on.
-i··’
Fifthly, before the privatization of the SEEs that 
are engaged in the production of basic goods and services, 
some measures must be introduced in order to protects 
consumers from price increases and low quality products which 
may be faced after the privatization.
And finally, being related with the fifth point, the
f
necessary measures must be taken in order to prevent a 
monopolistic trend after the privatization of the SEEs which
are monopolies in the first place. Because a private firm 
whose major aim is profit - making rather than service 
provision and is a monopoly, would have negative effects 
both socially and economically for the public.®
Ill - The Views For and Against Privatization
Privatization, although having a very short history, 
appeared to be a controversial policy having both its 
supporters and detractors. Both of the groups base their 
claims on some economic and political arguments.
The supporters of the issue are the representatives of 
the growing view that, the state has over extended itself 
and assumed roles which are incompatible with an efficient 
economy and free society. From an economical perspective, 
the supporters of privatization policy, assume that -^he 
private firms operate much more efficiently than SEEs in a 
market economy. As emphasized by the Adam Smith Institute: '
[t]he universal appeal of privatization 
lies in the fact that it is an approach 
which recognizes that the regulation 
which the market imposes on economic 
activity is superior to any regulation 
which man can devise and operate by law.
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It is an approach which recognizes that 
the market measures and responds to, 
the choices and preferences of people 
more accurately than the political 
process. A programme performed by the 
private economy can be done more 
efficiently, more cheaply and with 
greater satisfaction to its beneficiaries 
moreover than its counterpart can achieve 
in the public sector.'^
Moreover, according to the supporters, as SEEs will 
function more efficiently when privatized there will be no 
need for the government to subsidize them. Consequently 
there will be a decrease in budget deficit and inflation. 
The additional income generated from privatization will 
promote investments.
Besides these briefly mentioned economical arguments, 
one of the most crucial argument from a political perspective 
is the claim of the supporters that direct or indirect state 
interference to public sphere undermines individual freedoms. 
So in this perspective privatization appears to be a policy 
tool which will to a large extend reduce the state 
interference and enhance individual freedoms and create a 
share holder democracy, by giving a large number of private
investors a stake in industry.^
On the other hand, those who oppose to the policy 
claim that the SEEs must continue to have a place in the 
economy. From an economical point of view, the opponents 
stress the role of SEEs in regulating resource allocation in 
situations where market mechanism fails to do so. Due to 
the lack of capital in the hands of private sector, the 
undesirable attitudes towards high-risk projects and/or low 
profit expectations, the private sector does not invest in 
certain areas. Infrastructure and the production of some 
basic goods and services are among the ones SEEs invest in. 
Moreover, the SEEs by restructuring economy and some 
specific industries, play an important role in increasing 
competition in the economy.
The opponents also point out the social functions of 
SEEs which will be undermined by privatization, namely "the 
reduction of unemployment, the amelioration of inequalities 
in income distribution and the stimulation of technological 
progress.
II
Finally, the opponents strongly argue that 
privatization of SEEs will lead to a dependence on the 
foreign capital, which is to a large extend reduced by the 
SEES.
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In the framework of the above discussions it can be 
said that, the basic questions behind privatization are 
whether the state should involve itself in production and 
construction of infrastructure or whether it should simply 
define and protect the rights that individuals and companies 
have and whether it should be a producer and the owner of 
capital or whether it should be the 'protector state’, 
ensuring that everyone plays by the agreed rules of the game. 
Privatization redefines the role of the state and makes it a 
supporter of the market, which is an organization where 
there is freedom of choice within the rule of law.^
So it will not be wrong to say that, privatization is 
a radical change in the institutional structure of the state 
which shifts the laws of decision making to the civil society 
and provides economically and politically democratic basis 
for the system. And it must not be considered as a simple 
change in the ownership from the state to the public but a 
step for restructuring the state and civil society.
IV - Early History of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and 
Privatization in Turkey
As far as the aim of this study is to analyze the 
privatization experience of Turkey in the post-1980 era, 
before going into the details of the period in question.
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it win be useful to make seme preliminary remarks concerning 
the. place of the SEEs in the Turkish economy and the early 
attempts and evolution of privatization by giving references 
to the economic and political environment of the period in 
question.
The SEES has played a crucial role in the development 
of Turkish economy.
The origins of SEEs, which are actively involved in 
sectors of banking, textile, transportation,
communication and production of some basic goods can . be 
traced back to 1930s, namely the etatist period.
During the first years of the Republic (founded in
1923), there was a strong belief in the private sector for
the realization of economic development. An economic poliçy
■Ji'
depending largely on private sector was accepted in the Izmir 
Economic Congress in 1923. However, the expected 
development through private sector had not been achieved and 
Turkey had been in search of a new policy towards the end ^
I
of the decade. With the 1929 crisis and due to the lack of 
an aggressive indigenous private sector, the idea of the 
state’s economic initiative providing the driving force for 
industrialization, involving import substitution in basic 
goods industries was adopted. From then on the mixed
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economic model that had been pursued gave more weight to the 
state initiative than to private s e c t o r . M a n y  of the SEEs 
have been established during this period, including 
Sümerbank, engaged in textile manufacturing (1933), 
Etibank engaged in energy production and mining (1935), 
Soil Products Office (1938), Karabük Iron and Steel 
Enterprise (1936) and some others.
The SEES have been thought to be a practical solution 
to the economic problems faced during the period in question 
and the main rationale for the establishment of SEEs was to 
promote private sector rather than hindering its growth. 
Atatürk himself, has stressed the fl-exible character of 
SEES in a message that he sent to the Izmir Fair in 1935:
The etatist system that Turkey has been 
implementing is not a translation of the 
socialist doctrine; rather it is a 
product of the needs of the country and 
is peculiar to Turkey. What etatism 
means to us is giving priority to the 
economic activities of the private sector 
but at the same time compensating the 
inadequecies faced by the state
initiative.
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Thus, according to Atatürk, the SEEs were the 
products of necessities and of the time and their status 
could be changed depending upon the conditions.
More specifically, the roots of privatization can be 
traced back to the Act 2262 creating Sumerbank, engaged in 
textile manufacturing, founded in 1933. According to the 
2 ’^ ’^  article of the Act, when necessary the shares could be 
sold, all or in part, to the people or corporations by the 
proposal of the government and with the permission of 
Ministry of Economy.■'3
Moreover, in a report of the Supreme Economic Council 
(All iktisadi Mecí isi) which was established in 1927 and 
closed in 1935, it was recommended that; the participation 
of the people to the efforts of industrialization must be 
facilitated. In this respect the SEEs must be transferred to 
the people as soon as they become profitable and when “^ the 
people have the adequate financial means.
However these principles and recommendations could not
I
be realized mainly due to the Second World War and the lack 
of a strong private sector.
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During the post-war years, both the longing of the 
capital owners for a more liberal environment and the 
internal and external political developments had made it 
necessary for Turkey to adopt a multi-party system.is
Liberalism was accepted as the major economic
principle, and in the programme of the Democratic Party 
(DP) which has been founded in 1946 and came to power with 
the 1950 elections primary importance was attached to the 
development of private sector. In the articles 42 and 47 of 
the programme, it has been stated respectively that
'activities of private enterprise and capital are essential 
for the economic life’ and 'the state economic enterprises 
will be transferred to the private sector on suitable 
conditions’. ®^
In a speech made on 9 March 1951, the Prime Minister
I
Adnan Menderes stated the views of DP government ,on 
privatization as follows;
From now on we will not establish new 
state enterprises other than the ones 
which provide public services. And 
when possible we will transfer the 
already established state enterprises to 
the private sector within the framework
15
of a specific plan.
Although privatization has been accepted as a policy 
tool, during the 1950s, only a small number of SEEs could 
be transfered to the private sector. In addition, during 
the period, especially after 1953, the SEEs had been 
widened both qualitatively and quantitatively. Turkish 
Cement Industry (1953), Turkish Iron and Steel Enterprises
(1955), Turkish Petroleum (1954), Turkish Coal Enterprises 
(1957) were some of the SEEs that were established during the 
period in question.
The unsuccessful attempts at privatization was both due 
to the lack of a capital market and weakness of the private 
sector. But the most important reason was that of
producing more for meeting the increasing effective demand 
which was due to the monetary expansion of capital, had 
priority for the state than leaving the production to'“*'the 
private sector and facing some risks. Also the private 
sector was seemingly hesitant to take the place of the state 
rather than enjoying the benefits, that is cheap inputs
i
accruing from the SEEs. Moreover in a democratic 
environment, supplying jobs to the unemployed was an issue 
as important as supplying goods and services. The DP 
government by controlling the SEEs, was able to solve the
16
unemployment problem to a certain extent.
During the planned period, when the import 
substitution strategy had been implemented under successive 
five year plans (1963-67, 1968-72, 1973-77, 1978-83)20
the SEES had been the dominant providers of cheap inputs to 
the private sector, a point already made, keeping their 
important place in the economy. During the period in 
concern, the SEEs investments continued in an increasing 
fashion.
Table 1.1 : The SEEs’ Investments as a Percentage of
Total Investments and Public Investments 
(1963-1980)
% of total investments % of public investments
1963/67 15.9 34.8
1968/72 20.6 43.8
1973/77 23.4 50.0
1978 21.1 44.8
1979 27.0 54.1
1980 32.6 58.3
Source: 'The Turkish Economy 1983’, TUSIAD, Istanbul,
1983, p. 22.
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However there had been an overall dissatisfaction and 
concern with the inefficiency and less than satisfactory 
productivity of the SEEs. In this respect, in accordance 
with the Act 440 enacted in 1964 and which has provided the 
widest legal ground for the privatization of SEEs in the 
1960s, a commission was established. The main function 
assigned to this commission was that of initiating studies on 
the SEEs and proposing the transfer or liquidation of the 
SEEs depending on the results of the studies in question. 
Many such studies have been carried out by this commission 
concerning 70 enterprises; however no significant
development could be achieved. The SEEs continued to be a
burden on the public purse. 21
During the 1970s, the world-wide economic crisis had 
its implications for Turkey too. The sharp increase in the 
inflation rate due to the increase in import prices, the 
balance of payments deficits, industrial slowdowfis, 
foreign debt problem, appeared to be the major indicators of 
the economic crisis in Turkey.
Moreover, the underlying problems of the SEEs have 
intensified, and manifested themselves in an overt form 
during the course of the 1970s. The increase in the 
operating losses of the SEEs and the subsequent recourse to 
the central government’s budget to finance these losses were
18
identified as one of the causes of inflation and a factor 
that gave impetus to the emerging crisis. 22
Besides the economic instability, political democracy 
has been in trouble, and Turkey faced a serious political 
crisis. Increased street violence and civil strife have 
been accompanied by the lack of a decisive authority on the
part of the government due to the incessant bickering among
the coalition partners of the so called Nationalist Front
Governments which were in power between 1975-1977, the
first one being formed by the Justice Party, the National 
Salvation Party, the Nationalist Action Party (an ultra 
rightist party) and the Republican Reliance Party (a splinter 
party from the Republican People’s Party) and the second one 
including the first three of the above mentioned parties. 
These governments were conflict-ridden in the most serious 
manner, their conflicts involving critical constitutio.rial
issues. The conflicts frequently ended in immobilism.
Moreover during the period in question fragmentation and 
polarization was widespread including political parties as 
mentioned; organized labour, teaching profession, civil 
bureaucracy and even'the security service. 23
During the 1970s, privatization of SEEs was not in 
agenda, perhaps due to the economic and political chaos.
19
Political and economic crises have aggravated each 
other in the late 1970s. Consequently, with the seizure 
of the power by military in September 1980, a temporary 
abondanment of democracy took place. The aim was that of 
restructuring the democracy.
Following the 1980 military intervention, with the 
dissolution of Parliament and the political parties, the 
establishment of a Consultative Assembly as a substitute for 
parliament, and the purging of the civil bureaucracy by 
the military, the decision making in government and 
administration was de-politicized in as much as political and 
administrative decision-making gave way to a form of
'technocratic centralism’. Economic policy decisions in 
particular were coordinated in the Prime Minister’s office 
and taken by a small circle surrounding Deputy Prime 
Minister Ozal. This centralization eventually forced the 
government, faced with so many problems, to concent rate,.,on 
what is regarded as the most important - stabilization
poli c y .25
This stabilization policy was a.product of the stand by 
agreement which Turkey signed with IMF in 1980. It entailed 
a major policy shift, not unlike the similar policy 
measures implemented elsewhere. This programme, having 
the support of the IBRD, was designed to liberalize
20
Turkish economy by emphasizing market forces, opening it up 
to the outside world and diminishing the size of public 
sector.26 This new policy package included privatization a 
fashionable policy tool of the post-1980 period in Turkey. 
However, although the magnitude of privatization has been 
highly restricted during the early 1980s, the World Bank 
conditionality has been a prime influence on Turkey’s future 
privatization drive.
Besides, during the period 1980-1983, there has 
been some reform proposals, the most important of which has 
been the proposals made by Mustafa Aysan, the Minister of 
Transport and Communications in the transitional government 
of Bulend Ulusu. Aysan proposed a model involving the 
organization of SEEs as sector holding companies which would 
have made the SEEs to work according to the requirements of 
the day and facilitate the privatization process. However, 
expected developments could not be achieved.27
With the general elections held in 1983, the 
Motherland Party (MP) which had been founded by Turgut Ozal 
obtai hid the plurality of votes, and came to power.
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In the programme of the MP crucial emphasis had been 
placed on liberal economic polices and the transfer of the 
SEES to the people.
The HP’s political objective concerning privatization, 
which was stressed in many of its declarations, appeared to 
be the incorporation of the middle income strata into the 
privatization process thereby helping to extend property 
ownership to wider segments of society and making the people 
to participate into the decision making process, thus 
realizing popular capital ism.23
When privatization is evaluated as a step for promoting 
democracy by opening the way for the people to participate in 
economic decision-making through extending ownership to wider 
bases, 'privatization and free market economy seemed to 
have the potential of strengthening civil society. The
programme of MP did carry within it the seeds for the 
pendulum to swing from the state through political party to 
society.’29 Privatization was a new policy tool for 
political restructuring and decreasing the role of the state.
It
However, the possible consequences envisaged here 
have not been realized and the implementation of the
privatization policy during the late 1980s have shown some 
inconsistencies. In this respect, even the MP,
22
stressing the need to reduce the role of the state, ended 
in increasing that role. Privatization appeared to be a
policy for economic restructuration rather than political 
change towards more democracy.
V - Scope of the Study
The aim of this study is to analyze the privatization 
experience in post-1980 Turkey within the framework 
delineated above.
The study consists of four parts, including the 
Introduction in which some preliminary remarks had been made 
concerning, the objectives, the views of the supporters 
and detractors, the principles for a successful 
implementation and finally privatization attempts in the pre- 
1980 period.
In the Second Chapter, the general framework
privatization in the concerned period is discussed, by 
placing emphasis on the role of the IBRD in the process, 
the concept of privatization as nurtured by the MP
government, and the preliminary studies made including those 
on the institutional and legal framework.
23
In the Third Chapter, the actual implementation of 
the programme and its implications are taken up. In that 
chapter, the developments during the 1986-1990 period are 
stressed. Some emerging problems and the views of the 
opposition parties namely the Social Democratic Populist 
Party (SDPP) and the True Path Party (TPP) as well as The 
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) 
and The Turkish Confederation of Workers Union (TÜRK ÎŞ) are 
investigated.
In the concluding chapter, a general evaluation of the 
Turkish case will be made in relation to some inconsistencies 
that appeared in the overall policy of privatization and its 
implementation. An effort will also be made to account for 
those inconsistencies.
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Chapter Two
PRIVATIZATION AS A NEW POLICY TOOL OF THE 1980s:
THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Privatization appeared to be a fashionable policy tool 
of the 1980s decade in Turkey. As it was indicated in the 
previous chapter, although there has been many attempts
f
and discussions on this issue, no significant developments 
could be achieved up to the 1980s and the privatization 
process could gain acceleration only during the late 1980s.
In this chapter, the general structure of
privatization is studied. By keeping .in mind the
international dimension that has been an influential factor 
in Turkey’s privatization policy, the role of IBRD (whose 
involvement has been more to lay the foundations for 
privatization, rather than a direct role in the sales 
process) on privatization policies of developing countries 
in general and Turkey in particular is analyzed. Moreover 
the general framework of privatization policy as developed 
by the MP government and the preparatory works including the 
legal framework are scrutinized.
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1- Privatization in the Framework of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes
The increasing government expenditues and budget 
deficits in the late 1970s brought about the question of the 
SEES reform in many developing countries. The SEEs came to 
be seen as a burden on government budgets due to their losses 
and inefficiency. This poor performance of SEEs has 
prompted many governments to seek the assistance of the IBRD 
in the reform of the SEEs. However, the Bank assistance 
to reform the SEEs as a sector was provided in the 1980s
j
mainly in the context of structural adjustment programmes.
I - The Role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) on Privatization Policy
The Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) of the IBRD are 
mainly conditioned on the design and implementation of a 
certain set of reforms. These include, tr'a'^ e
liberalization (moving away from licences and quantitative
restrictions on imports and reducing the scope and size of 
the tariffs); getting domestic prices in line with those in 
the world markets; improving revenues by widening tax bases 
and making collection of taxes more effective; diminishing 
government deficits. All these measures are seen as
essential to lower inflation and to allow for new domestic
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and foreign investments. The SEEs reforms are perceived as 
part of a package of such structural adjustment reforms.··
As far as privatization is concerned, it is one of the 
methods used by the IBRD to reform SEEs. The Bank views 
privatization not as an end in itself, but as one of many 
means to help governments increase efficiency. 2
Since the early 1980s, the IBRD provided assistance 
on privatization to governments in approximately 30 countries 
in all regions, the majority of which has been in the Sub- 
Saharan Africa. The Bank has also been involved in 
privatization efforts in Brazil, Argentina, the 
Philippines, Morocco, Panama and Jamaica.^
Although, there have been many efforts on the part of 
the Bank to assist privatization, up to this time far larger 
amounts of Bank resources have been devoted to reforming SEEs 
rather than helping to sell them. Moreover in each of the 
countries where the Bank supported privatization, it at the 
same time helped the restructuring of those SEEs that would 
continue to remain in state hands because of their socially 
vital roles.^
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As far as the Turkish Case is concerned the Bank has 
played an important role in the SEE reform during the early 
part of the 1980s.
In the late 1970s, Turkey faced a serious economic 
crisis leading to the inability of Turkish governments to 
meet their external debts. The crisis was mainly due to the 
world-wide rise in the oil prices after 1973, the deteoriation 
in real terms of trade, the inefficiency of the inward 
oriented model of development and a deficit arising from the 
increase in government expenditures. The budget deficit rose 
from 1.5 per cent of GNP in 1970-1973 to 4 per cent in 1979. 
This deficit was largely overcome with the Central Bank 
loans, many of which went straight to the SEEs, whose 
financing requirements rose not only because of their large 
capital projects but also because of their continuing losses. 
This role played by the Central Bank in the financing -^f 
budget deficit led to an inflationary situation.^
2- Influence of IBRD on Privatization Policy in Turkey
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Table 2.1 : The Allocation of Central Bank Loans
(1977-1979)
1977 1978 1979
Public Sector 66.8 66.9 67.9
T reasury 23.9 23.4 24.0
SEES 42.9 43.5 43.9
Private Sector 33.2 33.1 32. 1
Source: 'The Turkish Economy 1983’, TUSIAD Istanbul, 1983, 
p. 52.
In the early 1980s, Turkey faced with such a crisis 
situation, had placed its economy on a new footing with the 
economic stabilization decisions taken by the Demirel 
government, which were inline with the general orientation 
of IMF. The most important feature of the programme was the 
formation of the internal and external balances of the 
economy within the rules of market economy, or within-·^ ' a 
liberal economic order.^
In this framework the policies adopted entailed the
I
reduction of government intervention in the economy,' an 
export oriented development strategy, and some measures for 
the promotion of foreign direct investment.·^
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Thus, the economic reforms introduced in 1980 were 
intended to bring about a radical change in the development 
strategy which Turkey had followed for several decades. 
This new strategy involved a rapid move towards a 
predominantly market economy which would gradually become 
completely integrated with the world economy.
Moreover, in the same period Turkey had signed a multi 
annual stand-by agreement with IMF supported by the SALs of 
the IBRD which to a large extend shaped the policies of the 
1980s. This agreement involving the close collaboration of 
IBRD and IMF, made Turkey to accept an adjustment-programme 
combining the short-term stabilization with medium term 
structural change.^
Within the framework of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme the IBRD appeared to be influencial in the SEEs 
reform, as it has been in other developing countries; "^he 
Bank aimed at reducing the government expenditures.
The SAL conditionality had entailed three major 
objectives concerning the SEEs reform. These were,®
. The improvement .of short term financial 
structure;
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. Redirecting investment programmes;
. The finance of SEEs from non-budget resources.
Privatization, however has not appeared as a part of 
the SEEs reform.
As a consequence of the latter reform programme the 
profitability of the SEEs was improved to a large extent in 
the post-1980 period in contrast to the negative operating 
profits during the 1970s. (see Table 2.3). However it can 
be said that this profitability was mainly due to the 
adaptation of higher product prices rather than an increase 
in productivity. ° Table 2.3 furnishes data on the finances 
of the SEEs during the 1973-1982 period.
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Table 2.3: Financing of the Operational SEEs (1973-1982) 
(TL millions at current prices)
19J3 I9J4 1915 -1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1931 1982
-2,250 -6,703 -8,862 -13,233 3.130 52,043 113,357 139,806
41,366 50,056 80,998 164,548 195,243 694,345 873,071 753.373
4,592 6,224 12,007 20,139 16,271 23,177 23,154 46,299
3,965 772 8,534 8,685 5,632 65,208 120,921 153,644
1,109 - 189 3,540 - 3 2,538 29,331
21,275 24,103 31.388 97,516 100,431 363,304 464,862 288,360
419 157 1,690 1,600 13 480 4.294 22,280
10,006 13,300 27,190 33,168 72,846 242.173 252,302 213.531
39,116 43,353 72,136 151,315 193,373 746,888 991,423 398,179
43,760 55,801 84.700 177,602 256,453 740,272 950,809 795,972
1.649 1,901 2,330 1,847 3,611 14.649 41.453 79,379
1,753 1,933 7,213 34.469 7,756 14,149 10,055 7,124
- - - 4,657 3,046 19,025 36,809 89,057
8.147 4,620 8,374 - - - - -
1,589 2,026 2,830 2,632 10,340 22.711 26,924 1,075
13,143 15,072 16,964 23,672 43,721 178,037 212.435 122.933
17,479 30,249 46,469 110,325 187,979 491,651 633.144 497,349
-4,644 -12.448 -12,564 -26,287 -58,080 -6,616 30,598 101,207
25,909 35,238 45,750 59,972 123,002 231,133 405,788 496,268
30,553 47,736 58,314 86,259 186,082 274,522 375,190 395,061
6,968 11,741 10,273 9,139 14,385 16,199 15,854 33,971
10,346 16,226 27,823 39,535 83,443 149,444 240,731 242,325
6,255 9,421 9,240 6,991 33,835 10,000 - -
1,430 3,811 5,732 14,139 42,876 82,723 93,759 100,386
5,554 6,537 5,236 16,455 11,493 16,156 24,846 18,379
I. Current gross profit 
before tax 361 833
II.
Ill
IV,
Other, financial 
resources 
Depreciation 
Accounts receivable 
Decrease in Siocks 
Shcrt-tera torrcving 
Decrease in casn 
Other resources 
(lill)
Total resources 
( I + I I )
Payitents 
Direct taxes 
Pa/7ients 10 State 
Investment 8anh 
External bepts 
Consoiioateo ceots 
Increase in cash 
Increase in stocks 
Other payments 
Short-ter.i oect 
payments
18,919
4,N3
I4I
1,166
5,110
659
5,834
34,569
4.240
656
142
14,039
393
14,994
19.280 35,40?
20,885
684
1,464
169
62?
2,8?9
10,920
40,531
618
1,800
1 ,2 0 0
302
10,231
20.169
VI. Fixed capital 
investment
3,542 5,111
le
-1,605 -5,214 
12,569 11,112
VII. Overall financial
ret|uire.nents (VtVI) 14,1?4 22,326
financed by:
Credits from State 
Investment Sank 4,514 5,670
Contribution from
general budget 6,059 7,176
Central Bank loans - 6,073
Direct project financing 
from abroad 3,541 2,038
Other borrowing - 1,319
Source: 'The Turkish Economy 1983’
1983, p. 172.
TUSIAD, Istanbul
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II - Privatization and the Motherland Party (MP) Governments: 
The Rationale and the Initial Steps towards 
Implementation
As noted above, with the general elections held in 
1983, which heralded a transformation of Turkish political 
life from military to civilian rule, Motherland Party (MP) 
obtained the plurality of votes and came to power. From
then on it started to implement its programme which has been 
very much in line with the economic stabilization programme 
initiated in the early 1980s, under the leadership of 
Turgut Ozal, who had played an important role both in the 
formulation of the economic stability measures as the 
Undersecretary of Prime Ministry in Demirel’s government and 
in their implementation as the Deputy Prime Minister of Ulusu 
government during the 1980-1983 interregnum. Consequently 
privatization again appeared on the political agenda as a 
part of the policies of the MP governments.
1- Privatization within the Framework of MP programme: 
'Reducing the Role of the State’.
The economic policy of the MP governments, being in 
harmony with the interests of international donor community 
and, therefore with the stabilization programme has been in 
favour of a free market model. In the government programme
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which had been presented by Turgut Ozal in the National 
Assembly on 19 December 1983, the following points appeared 
to be the major characteristics of the new economic policyr^^
Economy was to be permitted to develop within its natural 
laws; the free market rules were led to play the dominant 
role;
. The main function of the state in economic development was 
to be regulatory - regulating the economic relations of 
individuals and institutions, settling disputes, laying 
down rules to bring about economic stability, and
increasing productivity by removing obstacles;
The direct activities of the state in economic 
development, in general were to be reduced to mainly 
infrastructure works;
. The enterprising spirit of the citizens is the basic 
driving force for economic development.
As it can be gleaned from the above framework, in ti^.e 
programme of MP government, in economic affairs the
individual initiative appeared to have a crucial importance 
in comparison to that of the state. And privatization 
emerged as a tool in the realization of economic development. 
In the programme it was stated:
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Our government, as a principle, does 
not consider it right for the state to 
appropriate funds directly for 
investments that would be made by our 
citizens with their own means when they 
are furnished with necessary incentives.
We consider it appropriate for the 
eventual turnover to the people of the
SEES.12
According to Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, 
privatization was a tool, having the capacity to show the 
power of the people in Turkey’s industrial development. State 
would have a passive role in this development process, due 
to the fact that, it would mainly engage in the maintenance
of law and order, in the provision of education and health
services, in the building and development process of infra
structure, and in taking the basic decisions which w.o^ ild
regulate the agricultural, industrial and service sectors.
Within the framework of the passive role assigned to
the state, in various press conferences Prime Minister
Turgut Ozal made statements concerning the privatization 
programme and stressed privatization as a tool for promoting 
the role of the individuals in the economy.
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For instance, in a press conference held on 16 August 
1984, Prime Minister Ozal made the following points 
concerning the participation of the workers in the economic 
decision-making.
One of the most advantageous side of the 
privatization programme which will be 
implemented by our government will be the 
extension of property ownership on a 
wider basis. Consequently,
privatization will promote the prosperity 
of our country. In this model, the 
worker will be not only the owner of the 
company but also participate in the 
decision - making process. Moreover 
when the worker loses his/her job the 
share of the enterprise that he/she is 
holding will continue to constitute a ^  
revenue for his/her family and
himself/herself.''3
In another press conference held on 22 August 1987, 
Ozal defined this privatization programme of SEEs as the 
greatest economic reform of the Republican era, which would 
promote grass-roots level democracy by making the people 
participate in the economic decision-making process. He
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presented his ideas on democracy promoting role of 
privatization as follows:
For the first time in Turkish history, 
the right of property sharing will be 
extended to the people so the property 
ownership will be spread to a wider-base.
The savings of the public in gold and 
immovables will be channeled to
economy. The priority in the divestiture 
process will be given to the employees of 
the SEES themselves, to the people living 
in that area, and to the workers 
abroad. In this way the workers will 
have the opportunity to participate in 
the management of the enterprise. The
people living in that region will have a 
share in the SEEs, that provided them 
employment opportunities for years.
The savings of the workers living abroad 
will be channeled to their own country 
which will give them a chance to have a 
share in their own country’s prosperity.
In sum, with the privatization of the 
SEES, participation, one of the major 
characteristics of civil society, will
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be developed in a most effective wayj'’
When privatization is evaluated in the light of the 
above, it can be said that besides the aims of bringing up 
economic efficiency, and the construction of a free market 
model, the most important aim of privatization, appeared 
to be instituting a Thatcher style 'popular capitalism’ in 
Turkey by incorporating the middle income strata into the 
privatization process, thus making their participation 
available in the decision-making process and promoting
democracy. However in the actual implementation of the 
privatization programme some inconsistencies appeared and the 
sincerity of the MP governments concerning this particular 
aim has became an open question. The analysis of the actual 
implementation and the problems faced will be taken up in the 
third chapter. Now it is in order to turn to the initial 
steps taken towards the privatization.
2 - Towards Privatization
A- The Privatization Master Plan
The State Planning Organization (SPO), initially being 
the institution responsible for the organization and 
implementation of the privatization programme, authorized 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, among seven other 
companies for the preparation of a master plan for
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privatization in tnid-1985. The Turkish Industrial 
Development Bank, Industrial Development and Credit Bank, and 
Price Waterhouse Company had been employed as subcontractors 
in the project, a large part of which has been financed by 
the credit obtained from the IBRD and the remaining part from 
the budget of SPOJ^ The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
submitted its report in mid-1986.
In the master plan, the objectives of privatization 
were identified on the basis of the results of a
questionnaire distributed to higher civil servants. In this 
framework, the increase in economic efficiency by the 
mobilization of market forces and the development of capital 
market through the extention of ownership appeared to be
among the major objectives of the programme.
Moreover, the enterprises were ranked in a priority 
order interms of their suitability for privatization. In
doing this, two criteria were employed. These were the 
investment requirements of the enterprise in question and its, 
economic viability. Emphasis was on the criterion indicating 
the performance of the SEEs concerned in free · market 
conditions without some protective measures such as price 
controls and subsidies.' As a result, mainly two types of 
enterprises were identified in terms of their salebility.
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The non-saleable ones were the Public Service Companies. 
They were considered to be the ones on which the state 
control should not be eliminated for some period of time 
because of the particular functions they fulfilled. This
category included; State Material Office (SMO), Soil 
Products Office (TMO), Turkish Airplane Industry Company 
(TUSAS), State Airport Enterprise (DHMl).
The Report made a further distinction among the 
enterprises considered to be suitable for privatization. In 
this framework three categories were identified in respect to 
the portion of the enterprises that were available for 
privatization. ®
The first category included those enterprises where the 
entire company could be made available for privatization in 
the near future. Turkish Airlines (THY), Airline Service 
Company (USA§), were included in this category.
The second category comprimised those enterprises where a 
major part of the company could be made available for sale 
in the near future. YEMSAN and QlTOSAN, two companies
I
engaged in the manufacture of animal seed and cement 
respectively, were included in this category.
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The third category consisted of the enterprises where 
only a small portion of the enterprise could be made 
available for sale in the near future, the remaining part 
being either rehabi1itized or closed. Sumerbank, engaged 
in textile manufacturing and NETA§, a venture of the Post, 
Telegram and Telephone Agency (PTT) were included in this 
category.
Besides the points mentioned above some further
proposals were made in the Report. They were related to the 
pattern of the reform of SEEs. In order to increase the 
efficiency of the SEEs the private companies had to be taken 
as models and the enterprises should be prepared for free 
market conditions. Some of the proposals along these lines 
are given below.
The management and the control of the SEEs 
should be carried out on the basis of ^ e  
provisions of Turkish Commercial Code governing 
the private firms. In this framework the duties 
and responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
and General Directors should be rearranged 
accordingly:
The social functions of the SEEs (selling goods 
at lower prices, creating employement
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opportunities) must be reduced. If this could not 
be done than the state should provide subsidies 
for these functions;
. The excessive workers should be totally 
eliminated for the realization of efficiency; 
necessary measures should be taken in this 
respect;
The accounting systems of the enterprises should 
be standardized and reformed.
As a final remark, it seems interesting and rather 
paradoxical that, in the Report, foreign investors were 
identified as the major canditates for taking over the SEEs 
rather than the domestic investors. It was stressed
throughout the Report that the investments from abroad would 
promote the international competetiveness of the privatized 
SEES.
■ J i'
B- The Legal and Institutional Framework
As it has been stated elsewhere, the privatization
programme must be carried out, within the framework of laws 
and regulations for the realization of a successful 
implementation. The Act 2983, related to the promotion of 
savings and acceleration of public investments and the
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associated (decree) Act 233, both of which had been enacted 
in 1984, and the Act 3291 specifically related on the 
privatization issue, enacted in 1986, constituted the 
basic legal documents in the framework of which privatization 
of SEES were planned to be carried outJ®
However, as the (decree) Act 233 is mainly concerned
with the reform of SEEs and since the 38^ *^ ' article of the Act 
concerning the privatization was later partly amended by the 
Act 3291, the institutional machinery and the mechanism of 
privatization will be analyzed mainly in reference to the 
Acts 2983 and 3291.
In the framework of the Act 2983 the Public
Participation Fund was established aiming to encourage the 
savings on the part of the public, on one hand, and to 
canalize the savings to economy, on the other. Mainly 
three instruments were identified for generating revenue -for 
the fund. (Article 3, paragraphs c, b, d). These were;
. The sale of SEE assets by issuing share 
certificates;
. The offer of revenue-participation certificates 
to the public for the latter to have a share in 
the profits of the enterprises;
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, The offer of management rights of the 
enterprises.
The same article further specified the type of the SEEs 
for which the use of the above instruments were suitable 
respectively:
. The SEES which can be converted into holding 
companies due to their suitable structure;
The SEEs which engage in infrastructure v/ork in 
the sectors of transportation, communication 
and energy;
The SEEs which are included in neither of the 
two categories mentioned above.
Moreover, within the framework of the act in question, 
the Board of Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund 
(MHPPF) was established, consisting of ten ministers, 
elected by the Prime Minister himself (Article 6). The basic 
duty of the Board were those of deciding to issue share and 
revenue - participation certificates and selling management 
rights of the enterprises (Article 10). And also the Agency 
of MHPPF was established for carrying out the secreteriat 
the Funds was assigned to the Prime Ministry High Supervisory 
Board (Article 15).
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The Agency of MHPPF has also been given the 
responsibility for solving the housing problem by giving 
credits to low and middle income groups by the Act 2487 
enacted in 1984. The basic revenues of the Fund for this 
purpose were the import duties on cigarettes, alcoholic and 
non-alcoholic beverages and on luxury goods and taxes from 
petroleum products.
The MHPPF constituted one of the largest of the Extra 
Budgetary Funds, created by the MP government. The Funds 
can be considered as tools for increasing the role of the 
government vis-à-vis the parliament and the traditional 
echelons of bureaucracy, due to the fact that in the context 
of the Extra Budgetary Funds, expenditures could be affected 
without parliamentary approval, which is a privilage not 
granted to other forms of public expenditures financed 
directly from the budget.
There had been many debates about the Act 2983 between 
the opposition parties and the MP. During the debates the MP 
deputies frequently stressed the importance of this Act in 
the extention of ownership to a wider bases.2°
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In a press conference held on 8 February 1984 Prime 
Minister Ozal offered the following concerning the importance 
of the act:
In order to give an opportunity to the 
Central Pillar for raising the value of 
their savings and in order to accelerate 
the public investments and promote 
savings, we have sent a new bill to the 
Parliament. By the help of this act, 
our citizens will be able to share the 
revenues of the projects such as Bosporus 
Bridge, Keban Dam, the Ankara - 
Istanbul Highway, and with the revenues 
generated from the sale of the revenue - 
participation certificates, the state 
will be able to build new bridges, dams 
and roads in order to serve its people. 21
In the framework of this act, first implementation has_ 
been the sale of revenue-participation certificates of the 
Bosporus Bridge to the public. Although this' is not 
considered privatization in the normal sense of the word, 
this first move could be evaluated as a preliminary step for 
the privatization of the SEEs. It also helped to discover the 
enthusiasm on the part of the public for the privatization
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programme.
In December 1984, the revenue-participation 
certificates of the Bridge were made available to the public. 
In May 1985, the certificates for the Keban Dam and later 
certificates for the Keban and Oymapinar Hydroelectric Power 
Stations were also offered for sale. The public showed a 
great interest to the revenue-participation certificates. 22
In this framework it will not be wrong to say that 
these developments constituted a favorable signal for the MP 
government for further privatizations.
Later in 1986, the Act 3291 was enacted in order to 
accelerate the privatization process. The Act in question 
clarified the mechanism of privatization to a large extend. 
In the framework of this act the Council of Ministers was 
enpowered to select the SEEs to be privatized and the Board 
of MHPPF was empowered to select the establishment, 
enterprise and coorporation, whose publicly-owned assets 
were, to be privatized. Once the decision has been reached, 
the assets of the SEE, in question would be transferred to the 
Agency of MHPPF. However the enterprises, cooperations and 
establishments would be first converted to holding companies, 
though not subject to requirements specified in the Turkish 
Commercial Code, The Capital Market Code and the related
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articles of some specified codes, and than transferred to 
the department in question (Article 13, 14). From this point 
onwards the Agency of MHPPF would assume responsibility for 
the management and possible rehabilitation of the 
enterprises as well as the specific mode of transfer to 
private ownership. Although this act clarified the mechanism 
to a large extent, there appeared to be some gaps concerning 
to whom, at what price with what considerations the sales 
would be made and the involvement of foreign capital to the 
process.
Furthermore The Board of MHPPF has been replaced on 
28 December 1987 by The High Planning Council (HPC), by the 
(decree) Act 304. The HPC was consisted of ten ministers, 
three of which were to be elected by the Prime Minister, the 
latter being the head of the Council. However as a recent 
development within the framework of the (decree) Act 414 
which has been enacted on 10 April 1990, 
responsibilities of the HPC were transferred to the Agency of 
Publip Participation Fund.
When the above developments on the > legal and 
institutional framework of privatization are evaluated, it 
would be fair to say that a very centralized mechanism has 
been set up for the privatization p r o c e s s . T h e  affiliation 
of the Agency of MHPPF to the Prime Ministry thus making the
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department autonomous from other traditional institutions and 
granting it with many powers such as directing one of the 
largest of the Extra Budgetary Funds and carrying out the 
privatization process and moreover empowering the Prime 
Ministry High Supervisory Board whose members are directly 
elected by the Prime Minister to control the Fund can be seen 
as an effort on the part of the government to enhance the 
powers of the executive.
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Chapter Three
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIVATIZATION POLICY 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Although there appeared to be some minor 
privatization efforts in 1986 and 1987, the large scale 
implementation of the privatization programme could only be 
started in late 1988. It was one of the most debated issues 
of the second Ozal government.
In this chapter, starting with the developments 
in 1956-1987, the implementation of the large-scale 
privatizations are analyzed in detail, by giving emphasis to 
the problems that emerged and secondly, the views of the two 
main opposition parties namely the Social Democratic Populist 
Party (SDPP) and the True Path Party (TPP), as well as 
Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) 
and the Turkish Confederation of Workers Union (TURK-1$) are 
taken up, for a better evaluation of the inconsistencies 
and drawbacks of the programme.
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I- The Developments in the Post-1986 Era
1- Privatization During the Years 1986-1987.
Despite the large - scale privatization programme 
that has been planned, privatization has been limited to the 
sale of a few number of small - scale enterprises. Thus a 
slow progress has been made during the years 1986-1987.
In this framework, firstly the ownership of some 
public companies which were mostly incomplete, was 
transferred to private sector. Besides, the public sector 
shares in some private - joint stock companies were sold to 
private sector and also some public sector shares in some 
companies has been transferred to the Agency of MHPPF without 
transferring their ownership to the private sector.''
In mid-1987 the Agency of MHPPF announced the 
privatization programme, and issued a list of the SEEs t|>at 
were planned to be privatized, including the main SEEs such 
as Petkim, engaged in the production of petroleum products 
and Sümerbank, the SEEs associated with the main SEEs, such 
as five' cement factories of ÇÎTOSAN, as well as USAŞ and 
Boğaziçi Air Cargo (BHT) that belonged to THY and public 
sector shares of 15 private sector companies such as TELETAŞ 
and ANSAN. Although within this framework privatization has
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been scheduled to September 1987, it was eventually postponed 
to a later date. 2
This delay for introducing the large-scale 
privatization had its reasons. First of all, it became
clear in mid - 1987 that the preparatory works for
privatization, mainly the financial assessment of the SEEs - 
that has been included in the above mentioned list - have not 
been yet completed.^ Secondly it has came to be known that 
the size and capacity of the capital market was not big 
enough for the implementation of a large - scale 
privatization programme. This was due to the fall in the 
stock prices after the small-scale privatization carried out 
earlier. Even one of the Advisors in the Prime Ministry
made this point clear by stating that the government made a 
mistake in the introduction and the timing of privatization. 
He added that the stabilization of Istanbul Stock Exchange 
Market and the acquisition of a better understanding of s%ock 
exchange on the part of the public constituted a prerequisite 
for a successful implementation.'·
Despite these problems, in Autumn 1987 an 
advertisement campaign was carried out both on TV and in the 
press. Moreover a number of press conferences were held, 
and Prime Minister Ozal consistently stressed the crucial 
role of privatization in promoting the participation of the
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Central Pillar vis-à-vis the decision - making process, thus 
strengthening democracy. He defined privatization as the 
greatest economic reform in the Turkish history.s But as 
this campaign was carried out just before the 1987 elections 
and as there were still uncertainties, to whom and at what 
prices the sales would be made, the opposition parties
viewed this campaign as part of the HP’s political propaganda 
rather than an invitation for buying shares.® And one may 
argue that, the further postponement of privatization to 
1988 had to a large extent verified the doubtfulness of the 
opponents.
2- The First Large - Scale Privatization : TELETA$
On 29 February 1988, following an extensive
advertisement campaign, the first implementation of the 
large-scale privatization took place with the sale of 22 per 
cent of the shares of TELETAÇ company to the public with the 
aim of extending ownership and development of the capital 
market.·^ Why Teleta? - not being an SEE and having a low 
priority in the privatization Master, Plan - has been chosen 
could be attributed to its high profitability, due to the 
large investments, Post, Telephone and Telegram Agency 
(PTT) made during the years 1984-1988.®
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TELETA§ was a mixed corporation, with 40 per 
cent of its shares being owned by PTT, 39 per cent by Bell 
Company and 21 per cent by shareholders in Turkey. After the 
decision of the Board of MHPPF in October 1986, to 
privatize the company, all the PTT shares were transferred to 
the Agency of MHPPF. And during the actual implementation of 
privatization of the company 22 per cent out of 40 per cent 
of the MHPPF shares were transferred to public ownership. 
Nearly 3 million shares with a value of 15 billion TL were 
immediately sold to the people living both in and out of 
Turkey and to the employees through 4822 bank branch offices 
and through intermediary financial institutions. At the end 
of the sales, 41,695 people became shareholders.^
However, after the sale has been completed, it
was seen that the Bell Company became the largest shareholder
with its 39 per cent of shares. So in order to prevent this
foreign firm from controlling the management of the company
■ J i"
and thus protecting the rights of the small shareholders and 
to stop a future transfer of the shares of Bell Company and 
other local shares, that could have a negative effects on 
the government policies, a control mechanism was introduced. 
By this mechanism the Agency of MHPPF was to keep its control 
on management of the company through a right to veto, which 
entailed the preservation of a golden share until its 18 per 
cent shares were reduced below 3 per cent.''®
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The privatization of TELETA§, when evaluated in 
terms of both the number of the people involved and the quick 
sale of the shares, appear to be a successful operation at 
first sight. However, many criticisms can be made 
concerning the issue.
First of all, after a few months, the TELETA$ 
shares began to lose significant value in the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange Market, declining from their original sale value of 
5000.- TL to 2700.-TL. This disapointing result of the 
first large-scale privatization on one hand revealed the 
inadequate size of the capital market in handling a large- 
scale transfer operation, because any increase in the supply 
of the shares had a depressive effect on the prices of the 
shares due to the in adequate demand, on the other hand, it 
showed the ineffectiveness of privatization in development of 
capital market.5° It would not be wrong to say that the aim 
of TELETA5 privatization concerning the development ^-Of 
capital market could not be achieved.
Moreover, as it has been stated above, the
Agency of MHPPF has still appeared to be the major actor in 
the decision - making process of the company through the 
control mechanism introduced. This was in contradiction with 
the slogan of the MP concerning the increase of participation 
by incorporating the middle income strata into the
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privatization process. Thus privatization in this context 
only appeared to be the sale of some shares to the public 
rather than giving to small investors a real chance of 
participation in the decision - making process.
Besides, since one of the major concerns of the 
government has been the elimination of the extra burden 
caused by the inefficient and unprofitable SEEs on government 
budget, choosing a profitable company for privatization 
appeared to be a further paradox. But one can argue that it 
was done on purpose - to make the privatization seem 
attractive.
3- The Involvement of Foreign Capital in the 
Privatization Process
The unsuccesful TELETA§ experience made the 
authorities to realize the immaturity of the capital market 
in handling large - scale privatization programmes.
Moreover, the high inflation rate, -the economic
I
stabilization decisions; that were made on 4 February 1988, 
and the cash crisis in the market had negative effects on the 
capital market. This was indicated in the 1988 OECD 
(Organization of Economic and Cultural Development) report on 
the Turkish economy, too. ' '2
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As a result the inducement of the participation of 
small ivestors to another privatization programme through 
capital market no longer appeared to be a viable alternative 
for the government. In future, a new strategy had to be 
adopted.
Soon it became evident that the government would 
push through privatization by selling shares not on open 
market but to big capital groups directly. The former Vice 
President of the Agency of MHPPF, Cengiz İsrafil stated that 
selling 100 per cent of the government shares on the open 
market might be a mistake and that block sales should be 
resorted to.''^
This new strategy had been explained by the 
Agency of MHPPF as follows:
At the beginning of the privatization 
programme the main goal was the extention 
of ownership to a wider basis. However, 
it has been realized that the immaturity 
of the capital market would lead to a 
fall in the stock prices in case of a 
transfer to the public. For this reason 
in order to prevent the SEEs, being a 
burden'on the government budget, we are
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planning to sell the enterprises either 
to the domestic or foreign capital.
While realizing that this we will give 
priority to the privatization of the 
companies which are undertaking to sell 
their shares to the public after a period 
of time.·’'*
At first sight, domestic capital seemed to be an 
alternative to the public in the framework of this new 
strategy. However, the results of a survey conducted by
Turkish Union of Chambers (TUC) in 1986, showed that the 
business sector has been much more interested in having' the 
management rights of the SEEs rather than being the owners. 
Also, it has been stated that, domestic capital 
accumulation was not adequate enough for buying the shares of 
SEES.IS
Consequently, the foreign investors appear^ to 
be the only candidates to whom the ownership could be 
transferred.
1
Although there had been extended debates about 
the involvement of foreign investors in the privatization 
process, this new strategy began to be implemented during 
the final months of 1988 and the early months of 1989.
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ANSAN’s privatization, an enterprise engaged in 
the production of fruit juice, appeared to be the first case 
in which the market sale was replaced by block sale to the 
foreign investors. The government shares in the company, 
which constituted 88 per cent of the total shares were sold 
to the Atlantic Industries Company, which promised to open 
its shares to the public in five years time, depending on 
the financial situation of the firm and market conditions.^
This was followed by the privatization of 
ÇÎTOSAN’s five factories located in Ankara, Balıkesir, 
Pinarhisar, Söke and Afyon. All the government shares (90 
per cent) in the first four companies'and 51 per cent out of 
90 per cent in the fifth factory were sold to a french 
company - Société Ciments Français - for 105 million US 
dollars. According to the sale agreement, the company, by 
taking the development of the capital market into 
consideration, will open 40 per cent of the shares to the 
public in five years time.''^
The privatization of USAŞ was realized just after 
the sale of ÇÎT0SAN. 70 per cent of the shares were sold to 
the Scandinavian Airlines for, 14,450 million US. dollars. As 
it has been in the ÇIT0SAN case, according to this sale 
agreement, the company will open 30 per cent of its shares 
to the public.IS
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Besides the above mentioned cases, Boğaziçi 
Airlines (BHT) was sold to a consortium including some
domestic firms as well as the Irish Airlines. However the
agreement was called off, and the company was liquidated
after a period of time.''^
4- Recent Developments
In 1990, the MP government continued the
implementation of the privatization programme. In this 
respect in mid-1990, a part of the shares of seven
enterprises namely Petkim, Ereğli Iron and Steel Factories, 
Çukurova Electric Company, Kepez Electric Company, Arçelik, 
Bolu Cement Factory and Çelik Halat Company, has been 
started to be sold to the public but not completed yet. 20 
(see; Table 3-1)
Besides, the above mentioned companies, the
privatization of some enterprises including Sümerbank,
Turban, THY, Tüpraş, Gima, are expected to be realized
in late 1990, although the method of sale has not yet been
decided. 21
I
I
Moreover, the authorities are working on a new
privatization model, which has been invented in the late
1989. In the framework of this new model, the consortium of
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foreign arid domestic companies or the domestic companies by 
themselves will be able to barter the shares of their own 
company with the shares of the SEE which will be privatized. 
As a result of the barter, the shares of the companies will 
be transferred to the Agency of PPF, and the PPF will sell 
these shares and the shares of the SEE which would be left in 
the hands of the Agency after the barter, to the public 
depending on the conditions of the capital market. The major 
aim of this model is to make it possible for the domestic 
private sector to be involved in the privatization process, 
even if they do not have adequate funds.22
In the framework of the cases mentioned above it 
will not be wrong to say that although the extension of the 
SEES shares to the public still appears to be one of the aims 
of the privatization programme, it was less and less 
emphasized and there appears to be a tendency for block 
sales, both to the domestic and foreign firms.
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Company Government Government
Shares ' Shares 
before priv. sold
(t) · (X)
Buyer Hethod 
of Sale
Date Price (million TL)
leleta? fO.O 22.0 Public, Public 
Employees offer
February 1988 15,4C0.0
Afissn 33,3 100 Atlantic block 
Industries 
ltd.
■ 28 October 1988 22,850.0
Osas ICO 10.0 Scandinavian
Airlines
9 February 1989 32,014.0
Afyon Cement 93.5 
Fact.
51.0 Société Çisents ' 
Français
9 Hay 1989 23,569.0
Balıkesir Cement 93.3 100 . ■ 41,699.0
Fact.
Ankara Cement 99.3 ICO • • 59,829.0
Fact.
Pinarhisar Cement 99.9 100 V Я ■ 45,325.0
Fact.
Söke Ceme.nt Fat. 95.6 100 • “ 19,643.0
Ereili Iron and 51.5 
Steel Fact.
10.0 Public Public 
offer
9-10 .April 1990 132,392.4
Çukurova Electric 25.4 48.0 Public 16-1? April 1990 95.995.5
Co.
Keper Electric Co.43.1 22.1 Public 16-11 April 1990 23,451.0
Arçelik 15.0 50.0 Public 30 April-1 Hay 1990 50,162.1
Bolu Çenent Fact. 35.3 32.4 Public n 20,851.9
Çelik Halat Co. 29.2 84.2 Public î" m 19,545.6
Petkim ICO 8.1 Public 18-29 June 1990 313,100.0
Source: The Agency of Public Participation Fund
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Interest Groups
The involvement of foreign capital in the privatization 
process provoked many debates, and generated criticism 
among the opposition parties, the general public and the 
interest groups. The situation has been aggravated by the 
setback of the MP in the March 1989 local elections.
The government has been blamed for the new 
privatization strategy which was evaluated as the return of 
capitulations and as the extension of ownership to the 
foreigners rather than the employees and the public. The 
leaders of the two main opposition parties namely the Social 
Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) and the True Path Part (TPP) 
have continuously stressed their commitments towards 
renationalization of the privatized enterprises.
In addition to the views of the opposition partTes, 
also some interest groups and labour organizations such as 
the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association 
(TUSIAD) and the Turkish Confederation of Workers Union (TURK 
1$) stated their discontent by stressing the negative effects 
of the involvement of foreign capital in privatization on the 
independence of the Turkish economy.
II- The Views on Privatization: The Opposition Parties and Some
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A- The Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP)
As far as the party programme of SDPP, the major 
opposition party, is considered, there appears to be no 
provision directly related to privatization. However, in 
the framework of the general economic policies mentioned in 
the programme, some interpretations can be made concerning 
the issue.
In the party programme, mixed economic model has been 
accepted, attaching special importance to the maintenance of 
social justice. Within the framework of the mixed economic 
model, states role in the economy has been limited to
the production and supply of certain goods and 
services which can not be produced by the 
private sector;
the reduction of inequalities between the 
developed and underdeveloped regions of the 
country;
. the elimination of monopolistic trends.
1- the Views of Two Principal Opposition Parties
The SEES are accepted to be the tools at the disposal 
the state in performing these functions. Thus, in the 
framework of the party programme, it will not be wrong to
say that, as far as the state performs its specific
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functions in the economy there appears to be no provision 
against the privatization policy.
Besides through the interpretations made in the light 
of the party programme, a non-hostile attitude of the party 
to the privatization has been expressed by the party members. 
As it has been stated by a party member, the Social 
Democrats did not have a totally negative view on the issue. 
As far as the principle of social justice is preserved, the 
party has been in favour of the transfer of the SEEs to the 
public and the withdrawal of the state from some sectors of 
economy.24
However, the sale of the SEEs to the foreign 
companies, rather than the public, and some
inconsistencies in the privatization policy of the MP 
government such as offering the shares of the 
profitable enterprises rather than the ones that have been a 
burden on the state budget, selling the enterprises for a 
price lower than their real value, granting HPC with many 
powers concerning privatization (although it is a highly 
political council rather than technocratic one consisting of 
technocrats being specialized on the issue) provoked many 
criticisms and debates among the deputies. Consequently, in 
the 1989, there appeared to be a strong opposition, on the 
part of the party to the way the privatization policy has
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been carried out by the MP governments. The party members 
began to express their discontent by stressing their 
commitment to the renationalization of the privatized 
enterprises.
As a result of this discontent a group of 
parliamentarians from the SDPP presented a law suit to the 
Fourth Ankara Regional Court for the halt of the USA§ sale. 
The main reasons for the appeal were as followsr^s
Firstly, the pariiamentarians, considered the block 
sale of USA5 to the foreigners as being against the High 
Planning Council’s (replaced the Board of MHPPF by (decree) 
Act 304 on 28 December, 1987) 54^^ decision, which has 
been enacted on 30 April 1987 providing that the SEE shares 
would be sold to the employees, citizens, small investors, 
and expatriate workers.
Secondly, the sale price of the enterprise appeared 
to be below the real value. In the Morgan Guaranty Bank 
Report prepared in 1986, the value of USA§ has been 
calculated as 64 million US dollars, thus the value of 70 
per cent government shares being 44 million US dollars. 
However the enterprise was sold for 14,450 million US 
dollars.
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And finally, the sale of the enterprise has been 
considered to be in contradiction with the first provision of 
the Act 6224 concerning foreign capital. According to this 
provision only the non-monopolistic areas are allowed for the 
investments of foreign capitl.
The Fourth Ankara Regional Administrative Court, 
accepted the appeal that the MFC’s 54^^ decision has been 
violated by the sale of USA$ and froze the sale of the 
enterprise. This decision was brought before the Council of 
State and a stay order was requested, but this request was 
not accepted by the said court. Thus USAÇ could not be
privatized.26
B- The True Path Party (TPP)
Parallel to the party programme of the SDPP, in the 
party programme of the TPP, there appears to be no 
provision related to privatization.
In the framework of the programme, again mixed 
economic model has been accepted and the objectives of 
economic and fiscal policies have been made explicit under 
the following headings:^^
73
Raticnal allocation of resources;
, Rapid development;
Continuous and balanced growth;
Reduction of the unemployment rate to a minimum 
level;
. Spreading wealth to a wider-basis;
Increasing social security services;
Realizing the ideal of creating a powerful 
Turkey.
Although, neither the policies concerning SEEs nor 
privatization ha/e been included under the above mentioned 
headings, soms deputies, from time to time expressed 
their views concerning the issue by stating that they are in 
favour of market economy, they believe in the advantages of 
privatization, and support the idea in principle. But as 
it has been the case with the SDPP deputies, the TPP 
deputies, too, criticized the particular pattern of 
carrying out the privatization policy. The leader of “the 
party, too, stated his discontent, by expressing his views 
as follows;
I
The SEES are the property of the whole 
nation, not of the government. The 
nation and its intellectuals must protect 
these enterprises. By selling these
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enterprises to the foreigners we are 
moving a way from industrialization just 
as it has been the case in 1910s and 
1920s. The mistakes made during the 
privatization process will be remedied in 
the future by the renationalization of 
these enterprises.28
Moreover, just as the SDPP deputies did, a group of 
parliamentarians from the TPP, presented a law suit to the 
Council of State for the halt of the sales of USA§ and 
QiTOSAN on 8 October 1989 and 24 October 1989 respectively.28
The reasons and the result of the appeal have been the 
same with that of the appeal of the SDPP deputies.
Thus, it can be said that although the government was 
successful in selling USA§ and QlTOSAN by the block, ¡jthe 
privatization suits brought to light the legal deficiencies 
of the sales.
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2- The Views of the Businessmen and the Workers
A- Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
(TUSIAD)
In cjoneral, TUSIAD, an association representing the 
big business, has been in favour of privatization policy. 
Believing in the benefits of free market economy the 
Association has perceived privatization policy as an 
effective mechanism of decreasing the role of the state in 
the economy and injecting fresh blood to the SEEs which were 
not operating efficiently. In fact the first proposal
concerning the transfer of ownership to the public came from 
this Association. In 1986 one of the officials having a high 
position in the Association stressed the fact by stating 
that:
Privatization must be defined not as 
selling the SEEs to private firms but as 
the extentsion of industrial ownership to 
a wider basis.
However, as the privatization policy gained momentum 
in the late 1980s, there appeared to be some criticisms and 
discontent on the part of TUSIAD, concerning again not the 
idea itself but the methods used. In a declaration made in 
late 1989, the industrialists and Businessmen expressed both
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their criticisms and proposals.3i
In the first place, they claimed that the government 
has not furnished adequate information to the public 
concerning the procedural details of the sales, and this 
made privatization to be a policy which has been carried out 
behind the closed doors in the eyes of the public, paving 
the way for the reaction of the public. In this respect, 
TUSIAD earnestly proposed that the government should furnish 
information about the issue and enlighten the public as soon 
as possible, thus facilitating the acceptance of the idea 
on the part of the public.
Secondly, opposing to the centralized machinery, which 
was set up for the implementation of privatization, they 
proposed the establishment of a consultative assembly 
consisting of the representatives from labour unions, 
universities and private sector for the purpose of givi/ig 
advice and shaping the strategies of privatization.
And finally, although emphasizing their support for 
privatization as being a policy which would make the SEEs 
efficient, they expressed their discontent vis-à-vis· the 
idea of foreign involvement in the process, especially in 
regard to the privatization of the SEEs having a monopolistic
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status. Reminding the fact that the objectives of 
multinational companies could be against the national 
interest, thus having the potential of creating problems in 
the future, they proposed the adoption of some anti- 
monopolistic measures, in order to eliminate the problems 
faced, in case of a transfer of a SEE-being a monopoly - to 
a foreign company.
B- Turkish Confederation of Workers Union
*
The views of TÜRK-ÎÇ, the representative of a large 
number of workers in Turkey, highly deviates from the above 
mentioned views, due to the fact that TÜRK-Î$ in principle 
is against the idea of privatization. The reasons behind 
that view could be summarized as follows:
Although strongly believing in the crucial role that
SEES played in Turkey’s economic development by being the
■ J i'
driving motive of industrialization, TÜRK-ÎÇ mainly stressed 
the importance of social functions that SEESs have been 
performing, such as construction of infrastructure, 
helping to the development of underdeveloped regions,
recruiting technicians and administrative staff, creating 
employment opportunities, supplying public services to the 
people. TÜRK-IÇ did not consider it right to evaluate the
performance of the SEEs, by only taking into account the
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economic aspect and ignoring the social benefits, supplied 
to the people by these enterprises.32
Moreover, the privatization model of the MP 
government, involving the transfer of ownership to the 
employees and the public had been evaluated as an unrealistic 
model, due to the weak financial position of the latter
groups.33
Besides the above mentioned points, TURK-I$, by
reminding the role of SEEs in controlling and adjusting the
price mechanism and thus keeping the market in balance to
some degree, expressed their discontent with privatization
by mentioning their fears about a possible transfer of the
market to the monopolies which would cause increase in
prices.34 TURK-IŞ stressed their strong commitment to the
reorganization of the SEEs, by introducing new personnel
■ Ji'
policies and some measures which would make it possible for 
the enterprises to work more efficiently.
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Chapter Four 
CONCLUSION
Privatization has been a difficult and problematic 
issue in most of the developing countries in which it has 
been implemented. It would not be wrong to say that Turkish 
case does not constitute an exception.
As already noted, the MP governments at first sight 
seemed to aim at instituting popular capitalism, as it has 
been realized in United Kingdom under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Mrs. Thatcher, In this respect the policy in 
question entailed the extension of ownership to the employees 
and the public, giving them a chance to participate in 
decision-making process. So privatization appeared to be a 
tool for promotion of democracy by facilitating greater 
participation on the part of people and reducing the s%^te 
intervention in the economy.
However, the overall policy in general and the 
implementation in particular indicated a paradox, due to the 
fact that although the government articulated the need of 
reducing the weight of the Turkish state in the economy and 
of divesting the state of its assets, the privatization 
experiment in the post-1980 era has shown the signs of 
assigning an increased role to the political executive, thus
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reinforcing phenomenon of party centred polity. In this 
respect their sincerity about instituting popular capitalism 
became a controversy.
As for as the institutional framework of privatization 
is concerned, it has been a highly centralized one as 
already noted. A new bureaucratic structure was established 
for carrying out privatization, namely the Agency of MHPPF. 
And this unit has been affiliated to the Prime Ministry, 
functioning under the direct control of the Prime Minister 
and being autonomous from traditional echelons of the 
bureaucracy.
Moreover, the authority of making some critical 
decisions concerning the privatization of SEEs was given to 
the Council of Ministers and to the High Planning Council. 
The latter again comprised some ministers.
Besides, an advisory board was, established in e^ch 
of the SEES having the authority to make some proposals 
concerning these enterprises such as investments, 
marketing, exports, and the members of the boards were
I
directly appointed by the Prime Minister.
And finally the control of the Extra Budgetary Funds 
was taken from the High Court of Accounts which was
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affiliated to the Parliament, and given under the control 
of High Board of Supervision. The latter body is affiliated 
to the Prime Ministry.
When the administrative-political structure so 
instituted is evaluated in the framework of the general 
policy pursued by the MP governments concerning 
administrative restructuration of the state, it turns out 
that the following restructurations have been made;··
. Transferring some critical functions from an 
existing agency to a newly-created one, 
being usually affiliated to the Prime Ministry 
and headed by someone outside the traditional 
bureaucracy, such as the establishment of 
Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, 
assuming a role in the implementation and
generation of economic fiscal and monetary 
policies and leading to a reduction in the role 
of the Ministry of Finance;
. Bringing an autonomous agency under the control 
of the executive, as it has been in the case of 
Central Bank of Turkey;
Creating autonomous units within the existing 
agencies like the establishment of the
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department of Southern Anatolian Project (GAP) 
within the State Planning Organization;
, Creating additional ministries of State and 
granting them with economic responsibilities.
Thus, it can be said that there has been an effort on 
the part of the MP governments to reduce the role of the 
traditional bureaucrats in the overall system by creating a 
new and autonomous layer of bureaucracy autonomous from civil 
society. Also the above changes enhanced the power of the 
executive over the legislature and increased the role of the 
political executive in the economy.
Apart from the above mentioned developments, despite 
the rhetoric of liberal approach, during the period in 
concern, the public sector continued to be dominant in the 
economy. This was mainly due to the goal of rapid economic 
growth, on the part of the MP government.
Table 4.1 furnishes data on the share of public sector' 
and SEES in fixed capital formation during the years 1980- 
1988. '
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Table 4. 1: The Share 
Formation
of Public Sector and 
(1980-1988)
SEES in Fixed Capital
Total Fixed 
Investment
Public Fixed Investment Shares of SEEs 
in Pubiic Sector
(TL Billion) 
(%)
(TL Billion) (%) Fixed Investment 
(%)
1980 864.0 482.0 55.8 58.2
1981 1,254.0 780.0 62.2 53.5
1982 1,664.0 1,023.0 61.5 53.5
1983 2,182.0 1,226.1 56.2 57.4
1984 3,285.7 1,775.5 54.0 52.0
1935 5,554.1 3,228.4 58.1 53.3
1986 9,114.5 5,258.2 57.7 46.1
1987 14,'128.1 7,557.5 53.5 44.2
1988 24,524.0 11,641.0 47.5 40.1
Source: 'The Turkish Economy 1988’, TUSIAD, Istanbul, 1988,
p.11; Ziya Oni$, 'Evolution of Privatization in 
Turkey: the Institutional Context of Public
Enterprise Reform’, typescript, 1989, p. 32.
In addition to the dominant place of the public sector 
in the total fixed capital investment, also the financial 
system was dominated by the public sector during the second 
half of the 1980s. In this framework, the share of public 
deposits in total bank deposits increased, rising from 
1,736.8 billion TL in 1986 to 2,684.9 billion in 1988.2
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Moreover the capital market has been dominated by the public 
sector. The share of public sector securities stood at 90
per cent of the total securities issued.
Table 4.2: Share of Public Sector Securities in Total
Securities Issued (1983-1988)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Public Sector 
in billions 260 1018 2657 3057.0 5999.7 5298.4
in (%) 69.9 93.0 96.0 91.8 89.8 83.7
Total 372.0 1094.6 2769.3 331.1 6682.2 5972.9
Source: 'The Turkish Economy 1989’, TOSlAD, Istanbul 1989, 
p. 89.
And moreover, the contribution of SEEs to Gross 
National Product (GNP) has shown increases during the period 
in concern, rising from 12 per cent in 1983 to 16 per cgrit 
in 1984, and reaching its peak point of 20 per cent in 
1988.3
This increased role of the public sector and the SEEs 
in the economy as been interpreted as an effort on the part 
of the government with potentially conflicting interests, 
due to the presence of electoral constraints posed by the
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parliamentary democracy, re-established in 1983.·^  The MP 
government seemed to be in need of the state resources 
available in order to maintain its electoral majority and 
consolidate its position.
Although the above mentioned public sector-based 
expansionist policies had formed an economic environment 
shaped by high inflation rate and growing external and 
internal public debts and although the 4 February 1988 
stabilization decisions made to eliminate the macroeconomic 
imbalances, had adverse effects on the capital market, the 
MP government decided to push through privatization and a 
protitable company TELETA§ has been privatized. This 
experience showed the impossibility of the sale of the assets 
of the enterprises to the public through the capital market 
due to the immaturity of the capital market. Then the 
government shifted its attention to the foreign investors. 
Profitable enterprises have been sold to the forgjgn 
investors at prices lower than real value inspite of a lack 
of a coherent and suitable legal framework.
The attempt of the MP governments to sell the 
profitable enterprises to the foreign companies led to the 
degeneration of privatization policy, it became a method 
used by the MP government for setting its external debts 
rather than being a method for facilitating the participation
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o f  middle income strata to the decision-making process, as 
i t  has been declared or being a means for increasing the 
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the public sector.
As it has been stated in Chapter three, the 
i n cons is tenc ie s  in the privatization policy and, in some 
cases, the very idea itself, provoked many criticisms and 
a t tacks  both from the two principal opposition parties and 
c i v i l  so c ie ta l  elements, namely some interest groups such as 
TUSIAD and TURK-lS.
However, as it has been stated by a student of Turkish 
p o l i t i c s ,  the opposition that the MP governments faced did 
not o b l ig e  it to be more responsive to the organized
i n t e re s t s The main reason for this has been the lack of
a l t e r n a t i v e  programmes on the part of the opposition. The 
oppos i t i o n  on ly criticized the policies in question. As far 
as the interest groups were concerned, the 
' t e c h n o c r a t i z a t i o n ’ of the decision-making has made the 
bureaucracy less politically responsive. And this whole 
p i c t u r e  showed that in the post-1980 era, the politics has
been c a r r i e d  out independently from the civil societal
»
e lemen ts .s The case of privatization was no exception.
89
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1- Metin Heper, 'The State and Debureaucratization: The
Turkish Case’, typescript, 1989, pp. 18-9.
2- 'The Turkish Economy 1989’, TÜSÎAD, Istanbul, 1989, 
p. 56; 'The Turkish Economy 1988’, TÜSÎAD, Istanbul, 
1988, p. 51.
'Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri Genel Raporu’, Yüksek 
Denetleme Kurulu, Ankara, various issues.
For a detailed consideration of the logic of coalition 
building see; Ziya öniş, 'Privatization and The Logic 
of Coalition Building: A Comparative Analysis of State
Divestiture in Turkey and the United Kingdom’, 
typescript, 1989.
5- Heper, 'The State, Political Party and Society 
in Post-1983 Turkey’, p. 14.
3 -
4-
90
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Ayres, Ron and Thompson, T.C., Turkey a New’Era (London: 
Euromoney Publications, 1984).
Eroğul, Cem, Demokrat Parti (Tarihi ve ideolojisi~) 
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler
Fakültesi Yayınlan, 1970).
Heper, Metin, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, 
England: Eothern Press, 1985).
Kepenek, Yakup, Gelişimi, Üretimi ve Sorunlarıyla Türkiye 
Ekonomisi (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1983).
özmen, Selâhattin, Türkiye’de ye Dünyada iktisadi Dev 1 et 
Teşekkülleri (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1967).
Özmen, Selâhattin, Türkiye’de ve Dünvada Kit’lerin 
özelleştiriİmesi (İstanbul: Met/er Matbaası, 1987).
Pirie, Madsen, Privatization (London: Wildwood House Ltd.,
1988).
91
Ramanadham, V.V, Studies In Public Enterprise: From
Evaluation to Privatization (London: Frank Cass and
Company Ltd., 1987).
Shirley, M. Mary, Bank Lending for State Owned Enterprise 
Sector Reform: A Review of Issues and Lessons of
Experience (Washington D.C.: The 'World Bank, 1988).
Sunar, İlkay, State and Society In The Politics of Turkey’s 
Development (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi
Yayınlan, 1974).
Tekelll, Ilhan and ilkin. Selim, 1929 Dünya Buhranında
Türkiye’nin iktisadi PolItika Arayışları (Ankara: Orta 
Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi idari Bilimler Fakültesi 
Yayınları, 1933).
Tezel, S. Yahya, Cumhuriyet Döneminin iktisadi Tarihi 
(1923-1950) (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982).
Veljanovski, Cento, Selling the State (London: Weldenfeld
and Nicolson Ltd. 1987).
Wolf, Peter, Stabi1Izatlon Pol lev and Structural Adjustment 
In Turkey. 1980 - 1985 (Berlin: German Development
Institute, 1987).
92
Articles
Akgüç, Öztin, 'Özelleştirme mi Seçim Armağanı mı?’, 
Mi 111 yet (İstanbul daily), November 7, 1987.
Altıntaş, Mustafa, Özelleştirilen Özel Şirket’, Dünya 
(İstanbul daily), March 31, 1988.
Aren, Sadun, '24 Ocak Programı ve Alternatifleri’, in
îsbitiren Ekonomi (İstanbul: Bilim ve Sanat kitapları,
1936).
BabürcğIu, Selahaddin, 'Atatürk Dönemi ve Sonrası Kamu
İktisadi Teşebbüsleri’, in Atatürk Dönemi Ekonomi 
Politikası ve Türkiye’nin Ekonomik Gelişmesi (Ankara: 
Ankara üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi 
Yayınları, 1982).
Berksoy, Taner, 'Türkiye’de istikrar Arayışları ve IMF’,.^ ih 
IMF istikrar Politikaları ve Türkiye’. CevdetErdost, 
ed. (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982).
Biennen, Henry and Waterbury, John, 'The Political Economy 
of Privatiztion in Developing Countries’, World 
Development. 17, 5, (1989).
93
Bishop, Matteu and Kay, A. John, 'Privatization in the 
United Kingdom: Lessons from Experience’, World
Development, 17, 5, (1989).
Hanke, H. Steve, 'Privatization: A People’s Capitalism’,
Economic Impact, 63, 2, (1988).
Hazama, Yasushi, Politics of Implementation: Privatization
in Turkey’, typescript, 1989.
Heald, David, 'The United Kingdom: Privatization and its
Political Context’, West European Politics. 12, 3,
(1988).
Heper, Metin, 'Recent Instability in Turkish Politics. End 
of a Monocentrist Polity?’, International Journal of 
Turkish Studies, (Winter, 1979-80).
Heper, Metin, 'The State and Debureaucratization: The
Turkish Case’, typescript, 1989.
Heper, Metin, 'The State, Political Party and Society in 
Post-1983 Turkey’, typescript, 1989.
llkin, Selim, 'Privatization of State Economic 
Enterprises’, typescript, 1989.
94
Başladı’, Dünya (İstanbul daily), December 25, 19S7.
Kantman, Sönmez, 'Özelleştirme Gerekçesi ile Kamu Mülkiyeti 
Hakkının Kullanımı’, Dünya (İstanbul daily), January 
29, 1990.
Köfteoğlu Fehmi, '54 Yıldır Gündemdeki Konu:
Özel leştiremediğimiz Kit’ler (1)’, Dünya (İstanbul 
daily), December 22, 1987.
Köfteoğlu, Fehmi, '54 Yıldır Gündemdeki Konu: 
Özel leştiremediğimiz Kit’ler (2)’, Dünya (İstanbul 
daily), December 23, 1987.
Le Grand, Julian and Robinson, Ray, 'Privatization and
the Welfare State: An Introduction’, in Privatization 
and the Welfare State, Julian Le Grand and .^ay 
Robinson, eds. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984),
Nellis, John and Kikeri, Sunita, 'Public Enterprise 
Reform and The World Bank’, World Development,
17, 5, (1989).
öniş, Ziya, 'Evolution of Privatization in Turkey:
The Institutional Context of Public Enterprise
inal, Fasih, 'Özelleştirme Girişimleri 1930’lu Yıllarda
95
Reform’, paper prepared for submission at the 
conference, 'Dynamics of State and Society in 
the Middle East’, Cairo: Eg'ypt: June 1989.
Öniş, Ziya, 'Privatization and the Logic of Coalition
Building: A Comparative Analysis of State Divestiture
in Turkey and the United Kingdom’, typescript, 1989.
Selçuk, îlhan, '24 Ocak... Başlangıcın Sonu veya Sonun
Başlangıcı’, in îsbitiren Ekonomi (İstanbul: Bilim 
ve Sanat kitapları, 1986).
Tachau, Frank and Heper, Metin, 'The State, Politics and 
the Military in Turkey’, Comparative Politics. 16, 1,
(October 1983).
Thompson, David and Kay, A. John, 'Privatization: A
Policy in Search of a Rationale’, Economic Journal,
96, 1, (1986).
Türel, Oktar, '1980 Sonrası Kamu Kesimi ve Finansmanı 
Üzerine Gözlem ve Değerlendirmeler’, in Bırakınız
1
I
Yapsınlar Bırakınız Geçsinler (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi,
1986).
96
Uzunoğlu, Sadi, 'özelleştirme ve Gel ir Ortak!iği’, Banka 
ve Ekonomik Yorumlar. (İstanbul montly), September 
1987.
Vand de Walle Nicolas, 'Privatization in Developing
Countries’, World Development. 17, 5, (1989).
Reports
'Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri Genel Raporu’, Yüksek Denetleme 
Kurulu, Ankara, Various issues.
'Özeliiştirme; Kitlerin Halka Satışında Başan Koşullan’, 
TUSIAD, İstanbul, 1986.
'Özelleştirme Programı ile ilgili Bilgiler (30 Haziran 1990 
tarihi itibariyle)’. Kamu Ortaklığı İdaresi Başkanlığı 
Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Bürosu, Ankara, 1990.
'The Turkish Economy 1983’, TUSIAD," Istanbul, 1983.
'The Turkish Economy 1988’, TUSIAD, Istanbul, 1988.
'The Turkish Economy 1989’, TUSIAD, Istanbul, 1989.
97
Metin’, TURK-IŞ Araştırma Bölümü, Ankara, 1986.
'Türkiye’de Özelliştirme ile İlgili Genel Bilgiler İçeren 
Rapor’, Kamu Ortaklığı İdaresi Başkanlığı Basın ve 
Halkla İlişkiler Bürosu, Ankara, 1990.
Dal 1ies and Pe r io d i c a ls
Akiş (İstanbul weekly).
Cumhuriyet (İstanbul daily).
Dünya (İstanbul daily).
Ekonomide Diyalog (İstanbul bimontly).
Güneş (İstanbul daily).
Hürriyet (İstanbul daily).
Milliyet (İstanbul daily).
Nokta (İstanbul weekly).
Tercüman (İstanbul daily).
Others
'Türk-îş’in özelleştirmeye İlişkin Görüşünü Bildiren
Anadolu Ajansı 16-05-1990 Bülteni, Ankara, 1990.
'Başbakan Turgut özal’ın Konuşma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve'
Mülakatları (13 December 1986 - 12 December 1987), 
Başbakanlık, Ankara, 1987.
98
'Başbakan Turgut özal’ın Basın Toplantıları (7 January 
1984 - 30 November 1987) ikinci Basın Toplantısı 
Metni’, Başbakanlık, Ankara, 1987.
'Başbakan Turgut özal’ın Basın Toplantıları (7 January 
1984 - 30 November 1987) Altıncı Basın Toplantısı 
Metni’, Başbakanlık, Ankara, 1987.
'The Motherland Party Government Programme’, Ankara, 1983.
'The Social Democratic Populist Party Party Programme’, 
Ankara, İ985.
'The True Path Party Programme’, Ankara, 1985.
99
